Thoughts on animal welfare, animal rights, etc. | 58 comments (58 topical, 0 hidden)
Lobsters and crabs feel pain, study shows (3.67 / 3)
Findings add to growing evidence that virtually all animals can suffer

by Tom Hanc on 06/27/2009 03:56:51 PM EST

Pain (none / 0)
Pain is not really a well-defined term. You don't have to have a brain (octupus). Consciousness is not well defined and even less understood. How far could the concept of pain be extended? We are harming plants when we cut them. I know that is ridiculous and cannot be considered 'pain' in a practical sense. All I am saying is that to talk about 'pain' probably doesn't get to the heart of the issue either.

by LadyFriend on 06/28/2009 01:18:01 PM EST

[ Parent ]
Sure it is (none / 1)

From the study I posted:

"...Robert Elwood, the lead author of both papers, explained to Discovery News that pain allows an individual to be "aware of the potential tissue damage" while experiencing "a huge negative emotion or motivation that it learns to avoid that situation in the future"...

crustaceans possess "a suitable central nervous system and receptors." They learn to avoid a negative stimulus after a potentially painful experience. They also engage in protective reactions, such as limping and rubbing, after being hurt.

Physiological changes, including release of adrenal-like hormones, also occur when pain or stress is suspected. And the animals make future decisions based on past likely painful events.

If crabs are given medicine — anesthetics or analgesics — they appear to feel relieved, showing fewer responses to negative stimuli. And finally, the researchers wrote, crustaceans possess "high cognitive ability and sentience"...

...In the past, some scientists reasoned that since pain and stress are associated with the neocortex in humans, all creatures must have this brain structure in order to experience such feelings. More recent studies, however, suggest that crustacean brains and nervous systems are configured differently. For example, fish, lobsters and octopi all have vision, Elwood said, despite lacking a visual cortex, which allows humans to see..."

 

 

 

by Tom Hanc on 06/28/2009 01:30:03 PM EST

[ Parent ]
Ok (none / 0)
Interesting...I probably stand corrected...I'll have to ruminate on that one.

by LadyFriend on 06/28/2009 03:18:22 PM EST

[ Parent ]
This is wierd (none / 0)
but none of my plants have brains with which to register pain.

A conservative believes nothing should be done for the first time

by C D on 06/29/2009 01:41:12 AM EST

[ Parent ]
haha (none / 0)
of coursssseee!  lol
The point that I was trying to make is that pain and harm can be two different things. I didn't make that case clearly.
On the other hand, I don't think a brain is necessary to say something is in pain. My example for this is usually the octopus. This is a philosophical argument over semantics. Not particularly relevant for the depth meant for this discussion.

by LadyFriend on 06/29/2009 08:47:25 AM EST

[ Parent ]
WHERE pain is.... (none / 1)
Sorry, don't want to be the dog in the manger, but, this is not an argument over semantics. Harm and pain are very different things.

Of course a (centralized) brain is not necessary to feel pain. But neurons (or analogs) are. From that point on you can argue if something that an animal experiences is comparable to what we call pain. E.g. most of our reflexes don't need the involvement of our brain but are automated on the level of the spinal cord. It goes something like this: harm->reaction------> pain (->gain in experience).

I think that pain was "invented" to intensify and prolong the sensation to keep the reaction going and to facilitate learning. So that is why the scientists claim the crustaceans feel pain: because they groom and have learned from that experience.
I think even there is room for debate that while they have the sensation of pain do they suffer from it?
Most animals have reflexes similar to ours, but not all of them have the second part where the brain generates the sensation of pain. (the real question thus is: does anything in the animal produce pain?).

So, IMO, unless you (re-)introduce a non-physical agent (soul) you cannot claim that anything that does not have the receptors, effectors and processing units experiences pain.

by eborujion on 06/29/2009 09:59:36 AM EST

[ Parent ]
on pain, harm and suffering (none / 1)
When I described this as an argument over 'semantics' I did not mean to downplay the importance of such arguments. As a philosophy lover, I know that definitions are crucial to having productive discussions. I think I meant that these arguments were not addressing the larger points about social responsibilities. But, those broader discussions rely on 'semantics.'
I definitely agree with your assessment of neurons and pain leading to changed behavior. I'm curious how you would define harm in this context.
On suffering, I'm not sure I am following your logic. Does suffering, in this context, require some kind of awareness? Also, if an animal is capable of changing behavior due to 'pain,' do we have any choice but to assume that pain occurred? The other minds problem makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to assess what is 'felt' by such animals. To me, the real question is what is pain? Epiphenomenal? etc. I don't have a good answer to this question. I think your question 'does anything in the animal produce pain?' presupposes that we know what pain is.
As far as dualism goes, I don't think that is a solution to anything. (I realize you are not proposing it as plausible). An immaterial substance only complicates the matter since there is no way to analyze whatever mechanism it might abide by. We also have no way of knowing how such a substance could interact with physical minds/bodies. Dualism, IMO, only ever makes things worse.

by LadyFriend on 06/29/2009 11:33:08 AM EST

[ Parent ]
Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (none / 1)
I did not assume you were downplaying the issue, just wanted to give my $0.02 ;).

I would define harm as the objective, measureable damage done to the individual, pain as the accompanying physiological sensation (neural impulse and circling excitation) and suffering the emotion arising from that sensation and the subjective (conscious and subconscious thus not necessarily aware) evaluation which heavily relies on feedback from the brain (at least in us humans and presumably all neo-cortical animals).

As such suffering would be viewed as the quale of pain and epiphenomenal to it (but in itself a phenomenon as part of the consciousness). It can also be described as circling excitation on a higher neuronal level though and a case could be made that until a higher processing instance is reached suffering (or any other feeling) does not occur. Another way to put it: if there is no post-processing unit to evaluate the pain it would just feel like other "neutral" inputs like seeing, hearing, smelling (to a certain degree smelling is directly and instinctively coupled with emotions just like pain) etc. with maybe the spatial positioning sense as the most similar.

The distinction between pain and suffering may also be argued as semantics and maybe some will disagree with my assessment but I tend to break everything down to the biological level and then build up to the (IMO) most reasonable conclusion and avoid a priori assumptions.

IMO suffering requires some kind of stress or activation response that deeply afflicts the individual. To a certain degree that can be measured but I am not sure how that applies to certain "borderline" animals like said crustaceans.

I also have not good answers to all those questions and I am not sure the answers are necessary to establish basic animal rights.

Dualism=bs, I think we agree on that ;).

by eborujion on 06/29/2009 07:26:21 PM EST

[ Parent ]
and I was being a smart ass (none / 0)
you have to factor that in

A conservative believes nothing should be done for the first time

by C D on 06/29/2009 11:02:26 PM EST

[ Parent ]

Thoughts on animal welfare, animal rights, etc. | 58 comments (58 topical, 0 hidden)